'I am worried because this is the biggest storm we have seen here,' said Jonathan Negron, 41, as he supervised workers boarding up his souvenir shop. Governor Rick Scott activated 100 members of the Florida National Guard to be deployed across the state, and 7,000 more National Guard members. Beijing did not ask for ownership rights to Diamer-Bhasha dam, unnamed official with state planning agency says. Gwadar Port, a deep-sea port on the Arabian Sea at Gwadar in Pakistan's Balochistan province, is seen as vital to the US$57 billion CEPC plan and a crucial element of China's massive.

Following is a transcript of the third day of confirmation hearings for, as recorded by Federal News Service. Judge Sotomayor answered first-round questions from Senators,,,,,, and. Additional second-round questions were asked by Senators,,,, and. Senator also spoke during the hearing. LEAHY: Good morning, everyone.

Judge, it's good to see you back, and your family. Judge Sotomayor, yesterday you answered questions from 11 senators. Frankly, I feel you demonstrated your commitment to the fair and impartial application of law. You certainly demonstrated your composure and patience and your extensive legal knowledge. Today we'll have questioning from the remaining eight members of the committee. And then—just to set the schedule—once we've finished that questioning, we will arrange a time to go into the traditional—something we do every time with a Supreme Court nominee, the traditional closed-door session, which is usually not very lengthy, and then go back to others.

I've talked with Senator Sessions. We will then go to a second round of questions of no more than 20 minutes each. I've talked with a number of senators that have told me they will not use anywhere near that 20 minutes, although every senator has the right to do it. And I would hope we might be able to wrap it up. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Good morning, Judge.

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Good morning, Senator. It's good to see you again.

CORNYN: Good to see you. I recall when we met in my office, you told me how much you enjoy the back and forth that lawyers and judges do. And I appreciate the good humor and attitude that you brought to this, and I very much appreciate your willingness to serve on the highest court in the land. I'm afraid that sometimes in the past these hearings have gotten so downright nasty and contentious that some people are dissuaded from willingness to serve, which I think is a great—is a great tragedy. And of course, some have been filibustered.

They have been denied the opportunity to have an up-or-down vote on the Senate floor. I told you when we visited in my office that's not going to happen to you, if I have anything to say about it. You will get that up-or-down vote on the Senate floor. But I want to ask your assistance this morning to try to help us reconcile two pictures that I think have emerged during the course of this hearing. One is, of course, as Senator Schumer and others have talked about, your lengthy tenure on the federal bench as a trial judge and Court of Appeals judge.

And then, there's the other picture that has emerged, from your speeches and your other writings. And I need your help trying to reconcile those two pictures, because I think a lot of people have wondered about that. And I guess the reason why it's even more important that we understand how you reconcile some of your other writings with your judicial experience and tenure is the fact that, of course, now you will not be a lower-court judge, subject to the appeals to the Supreme Court; you will be free, as a United States Supreme Court justice, to basically do what you want, with no court reviewing those decisions—harkening back to the quote we started with during my opening statement about the Supreme Court being infallible only because it's final. So I want just to start with the comments that you made about the 'wise Latina' speech, that by my count you made at least five times between 1994 and 2003. You indicated that this was really – and please correct me if I'm wrong; I'm trying to quote your words—a, quote, 'failed rhetorical flourish that fell flat.' I believe at another time you said they were, quote, 'words that don't make sense,' close quote. And another time, I believe you said it was, quote, 'a bad idea,' close quote.

Am I accurately characterizing your thoughts about the use of that—of that phrase that has been talked about so much? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Yes, generally. But the point I was making was that Justice O'Connor's words, the ones that I was using as a platform to make my point about the value of experience, generally, in the legal system—was that her words, literally, and mine, literally, made no sense—at least, not in the context of what judges do or—what judges do. Advertisement I didn't and don't believe that Justice O'Connor intended to suggest that when two judges disagree one of them has to be unwise. And if you read her literal words, that wise old men and wise old woman—women would come to the same decisions in cases, that's what the words would mean. But that's clearly not what she meant. And if you listen to my words, it would have the same suggestion: that only Latinos would come to wiser decisions.

But that wouldn't make sense in the context of my speech either, because I pointed out in the speech that eight—nine white men had decided Brown versus Board of Education. And I noted in a separate paragraph of the speech that no one person speaks in the voice of any group. So my rhetorical flourish, just like hers, can't be read literally. CORNYN: But Judge— JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: It had a different meaning in the context of the entire speech. CORNYN: But Judge, she said a wise man and a wise woman would reach the same conclusion. You said that a wise Latina woman would reach a better conclusion than a male counterpart.

What I'm confused about—are you standing by that statement? Or are you saying that it was a bad idea, and you—are you disavowing that statement? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: It is clear from the attention that my words have gotten and the manner in which it has been understood by some people that my words failed. They didn't work. The message that the entire speech attempted to deliver, however, remains the message that I think Justice O'Connor meant, the message that higher nominees including Justice Alito meant when he said that his Italian ancestry he considers when he's deciding discrimination cases.

I don't think he meant, I don't think Justice O'Connor meant, that personal experiences compel results in any way. I think life experiences generally, whether it's that I'm a Latina or was a state prosecutor or have been a commercial litigator or been a trial judge and an appellate judge, that the mixture of all—of all of those things, the amalgam of them, help me to listen and understand. But all of us understand, because that's the kind of judges we have proven yourself to be, we rely on the law to command the results in the case.

So when one talks about life experiences, and even in the context of my speech, my message was different than I understand my words have been understood by some. CORNYN: So you'd—do you stand by your words of yesterday in—when you said it was a failed rhetorical flourish that fell flat, that they are words that don't make sense, and that they're a bad idea? Advertisement JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I stand by the words; it fell flat.

And it—and I understand that some people have understood them in a way that I never intended. And I would hope that, in the context of the speech, that they would be understood. CORNYN: Well, you spoke about the law students to whom these comments were frequently directed and your desire to inspire them. If in fact the message that they heard was that the quality of justice depends on the sex, race or ethnicity of the judge, is that a understanding that you would regret? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I would regret that, because, for me, the work I do with students—and it's just not in the context of those six speeches.

As you know, I give dozens more speeches to students all the time, and to lawyers of all backgrounds. And I give—and have spoken to community groups of all type. And what I do in each of those situations is to encourage both students and, as I did when I spoke to new immigrants that I was admitting as students, to try to encourage them to participate on all levels of our society. I tell people that that's one of the great things about America, that we can do so many different things and participate so fully in all of the opportunities America presents. It's a message that I deliver repeatedly, and as the context of all of my speeches is, I've made it; so can you.

Work hard at it. Pay attention to what you're doing, and participate. CORNYN: Let me ask about another speech you gave in 1996 that was published in the Suffolk University Law Review, where you wrote what appears to be an endorsement of the idea that judges should change the law. You wrote, quote, 'change, sometimes radical change, can and does occur in a legal system that serves a society whose social policy itself changes.'

You noted with apparent approval that, quote, 'a given judge or judges may develop a novel approach to a specific set of facts or legal framework that pushes the law in a new direction,' close quote. Can you explain what you meant by those words? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: The title of that speech was 'Returning Majesty to the Law.' As I hope I communicated in my opening remarks, I'm passionate about the practice of law and judging, passionate in sense of respecting the rule of law so much. The speech was given in the context of talking to young lawyers and saying: Don't participate in the cynicism that people express about our legal system. CORNYN: What kind of—excuse me.

I didn't mean to interrupt you. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: And I was encouraging them not to fall into the trap of calling decisions that the public disagrees with, as they sometimes do, 'activism,' or using other labels, but to try to be more engaged in explaining the law and the process of law to the public. Advertisement And in the context of the words that you quoted to me, I pointed out to them explicitly, about evolving social changes, that what was I referring to is, Congress is passing new laws all the time, and so whatever was viewed as settled law previously will often get changed because Congress has changed something. I also spoke about the fact that society evolves in terms of technology and other developments, and so the law is being applied to a new set of facts.

In terms of talking about different approaches in law, I was talking about the fact that there are some cases that are viewed as radical—and I think I mentioned just one case, Brown versus Board of Education—and explaining and encouraging them to explain that process too. And there are new directions in the law in terms of the court. The court—Supreme Court is often looking at its precedents and considering whether in certain circumstances the president is owed deference for very important reasons, but the court takes a new direction. And those new directions rarely if ever come at the initiation of the court; they come because lawyers are encouraging the court to look at a situation in a new way, to consider it in a different way. What I was telling those young lawyers is, don't play into people's skepticism about the law; look to explain to them the process.

I also, when I was talking about returning majesty to the law, I spoke to them about what judges can do. And I talked about, in the second half of that speech, that we had an obligation to ensure that we were monitoring the behavior of lawyers before us, so that when questionable ethical or other conduct could bring disrepute to the legal system, that we monitor our lawyers, because that would return— SEN. CORNYN: Judge, if you let me—I think we're straying away from the question I had talking about oversight of lawyers. Would you explain how, when you say judges should—or I'm sorry, let me just ask. Do you believe that judges ever change the law? I take it from your statement that you do. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: They change—we can't change law.

We're not lawmakers. But we change our view of how to interpret certain laws based on new facts, new developments of doctrinal theory, considerations of whether—what the reliance of society may be in an old rule. We think about whether a rule of law has proven workable. We look at how often the court has affirmed a prior understanding of how to approach an issue. But in those senses there's changes by judges in the popular perception that we're changing the law. CORNYN: In another speech in 1996, you celebrated the uncertainty of the law.

You wrote that the law is always in a, quote, 'necessary state of flux,' close quote. You wrote that the law judges declare is not, quote, a definitive, capital 'L' law that would make—that many would like to think exist,' close quote. And, quote, 'that the public fails to appreciate the importance of the indefiniteness in the law.' Advertisement Can you explain those statements? And why do you think indefiniteness is so important to the law?

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: It's not that it's important to the law as much as it is that it's what legal cases are about. People bring cases to courts because they believe that precedents don't clearly answer the fact situation that they're presenting in their individual case. That creates uncertainty. That's why people bring cases.

And they say, 'Look, the law says this, but I'm entitled to that. I have this set of facts that entitle me to relief under the law.' It's the entire process of law.

If law was always clear, we wouldn't have judges. It's because there is indefiniteness, not in what the law is, but its application to new facts, that people sometimes feel it's unpredictable. That speech, as others I've given, is an attempt to encourage judges to explain to the public more of the process.

The role of judges is to ensure that they are applying the law to those new facts; that they're interpreting that law with Congress' intent, being informed by what precedents say about the law and Congress' intent and applying it to the new facts. But that's what the role of the courts is. And obviously, the public is going to become impatient with that, if they don't understand that process. And I'm encouraging lawyers to do more work in explaining the system, in explaining what we are doing as courts. CORNYN: In a 2001 speech at Berkeley, you wrote, quote, 'Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural differences, a possibility I abhor less or discount less than my colleague Judge Cedarbaum, our gender and national origins may and will make a difference in our judging,' close quote.

The difference—a difference is physiological if it relates to the mechanical, physical, or biochemical functions of the body, as I understand the word. What do you mean by that? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I was talking just about that. There are in the law—there have been upheld in certain situations that certain job positions have a requirement for a certain amount of strength or other characteristics that maybe the—a person who fits that characteristics and have that job. But there are differences that may affect a particular type of work. We do that all the time.

CORNYN: We're talking about judging, though, aren't— JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: You need to be a pilot who has good eyesight. CORNYN: We're not talking about pilots. We're talking about judging, right?

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: No, no, no, no. But what I'm—was talking about there, because the context of that was talking about the difference in the process of judging, and the process of judging, for me, is what life experiences brings to the process. It helps you listen and understand. It doesn't change what the law is or what the law commands.

A life experience as a prosecutor may help me listen and understand an argument in a criminal case. It may have no relevancy to what happens in an antitrust suit. It's just a question of the process of judging. It improves both the public's confidence that there are judges from a variety of different backgrounds on the bench, because they feel that all issues will be more—better – at least addressed, not that it's better addressed, but that it helps that process of feeling confidence that all arguments are going to be listened to and understand. Advertisement SEN. CORNYN: So you stand by the comment that—or the statement that inherent physiological differences will make a difference in judging.

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I'm not sure of that—I'm not sure exactly where that could play out, but I was asking a hypothetical question. In that paragraph I was saying, look, we just don't know. If you read the entire part of that speech, what I was saying is, let's ask the question. That's what all of these studies are doing. Ask the question if there's a difference.

Ignoring things and saying, you know, it doesn't happen isn't an answer to situation. It's consider it, consider it as a possibility, and think about it. But I certainly wasn't intending to suggest that there would be a difference that affected the outcome. I talked about there being a possibility that it could affect the process of judging. CORNYN: As you can tell, I'm struggling a little bit to understand how your statement about physiological differences could affect the outcome or ffect judging, and your stated commitment to fidelity to the law as being your sole standard, and how any litigant can know where that will end. But let me ask you, on another topic, there was a Washington Post story on May the 29th, 2009, where—that starts out saying, 'The White House scrambled yesterday to assuage worries from liberal groups about Judge Sotomayor's scant record on abortion rights. And the White House'—said—it goes on to say, 'White House press secretary said the president did not ask Sotomayor specifically about abortion rights during their interview.'

Is that correct? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Yes. It is absolutely correct.

I was asked no question by anyone, including the president, about my views on any specific legal issue. CORNYN: Do you know, then, on what basis, if that's the case—and I accept your statement—on what basis that the White House officials would subsequently send a message that abortion-rights groups do not need to worry about how you might rule in a challenge to Roe versus Wade? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: No, sir, because you just have to look at my record to now that in the cases that I addressed on all issues, I follow the law. Advertisement SEN. CORNYN: On what basis would George Pavia, who was apparently senior partner in the law firm that hired you as a corporate litigator—on what basis would he say that he thinks support of abortion rights would be in line with your generally liberal instincts? He's quoted in this article saying, quote, 'I can guarantee she'll be for abortion rights,' close quote. On what basis would Mr.

Pavia say that, if you know? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I have no idea, since I know for a fact I never spoke to him about my views on abortion—frankly, on my views on any social issue. George was the—was the head partner of my firm, but our contact was not on a daily basis. I have no idea why he's drawing that conclusion, because if he looked at my record, I have ruled according to the law in all cases addressed to the issue of the termination of abortion rights, of women's right to terminate their pregnancy. And I've voted in cases in which I've upheld the application of the Mexico City policy, which was a policy in which the government was not funding certain— SEN. CORNYN: Right.

Do you agree with— JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: -- abortion-related activities. CORNYN: Do you agree with his statement that you have generally liberal instincts? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: If he was talking about the fact that I served on a particular board that promoted equal opportunity for people, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, then you could talk about that being a liberal instinct in the sense that I promote equal opportunity in America and the attempts to ensure that. But he has not read my jurisprudence for 17 years, I can assure you. He's a corporate litigator. And my experience with corporate litigators is that they only look at the law when it affects the case before them.

CORNYN: (Laughs.) JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: (Laughs.) SEN. CORNYN: Well, I hope, as you suggested, not only liberals endorse the idea of equal opportunity in this country. That's a—that's a, I think, bedrock doctrine that undergirds all of our – all of our law. But that brings me, in the short time I have left, to the New Haven firefighter case.

As you know, there are a number of the New Haven firefighters who are here today and will testify tomorrow. Advertisement And I have to tell you, Your Honor, as a—as a former judge myself, I was shocked to see that the sort of treatment that the three-judge panel you served on gave to the claims of these firefighters by a(n) unpublished summary order, which has been pointed out in the press, will—would not likely to be reviewed or even caught by other judges on the 2nd Circuit except for the fact that Judge Cabranes read about a comment made by the lawyer representing the firefighters in the press, that the court gave short shrift to the claims of the firefighters. Judge Cabranes said that core issue presented by this case, the scope of a municipal employer's authority to disregard examination results based solely on the successful applicant, is not addressed by any precedent of the Supreme Court or our circuit. And looking at the—looking at the unpublished summary order, this three-judge panel of the 2nd Circuit doesn't cite any legal authority whatsoever to support its conclusion. Can you explain to me why—why you would deal with it in a way that appears to be so—well, dismissive may be too strong a word—but avoid the very important claims that the Supreme Court ultimately reversed you on that were raised by the firefighters' appeal? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Senator, I can't speak to what brought this case to Judge Cabranes's attention. I can say the following, however.

When parties are dissatisfied with a panel decision, they can file a petition for rehearing en banc. And in fact, that's what happened in the Ricci case. Those briefs are routinely reviewed by judges. And so publishing by summary order—or addressing an issue by summary order or by published opinion doesn't hide a party's claims from other judges. They get the petitions for rehearing. Similarly, parties, when they're dissatisfied with what a circuit has done, file petitions for certiorari, which is a request for the Supreme Court to review a case.

And so the court looks at that as well. And so, regardless of how a circuit decided a case, it's not a question of hiding it from others. With respect to the broader question that you're raising, which is, why do you do it by summary order or why do you do it in a published opinion or in a per curiam, the question—or the practice is that about 75 percent of circuit court decisions are decided by summary order, in part because we can't handle the volume of our work if we were writing long decisions in every case; but more importantly, because not every case requires a long opinion if a district court opinion has been clear and thorough on an issue. And in this case, there was a 78-page decision by the district court. It adequately explained the question that the Supreme Court addressed and reviewed.

And so to the extent that a particular panel considers that an issue has been decided by existing precedent, that's a question that the court above can obviously revisit, as it did in Ricci, where it looked at it and said, well, we understand what the circuit did, we understand what existing law is, but we should be looking at this question in a new way. That's the job of the Supreme Court. I would— SEN. CORNYN: But Judge, even the district court admitted that a jury could rationally infer that city officials worked behind the scenes to sabotage the promotional examinations because they knew that the exams—they knew that were the exams certified, the mayor would incur the wrath of Reverend Boise Kimber and other influential leaders of New Haven's African-American community. So you decided that based on their claim of potential disparate impact liability, that there was no recourse—that the city was justified in disregarding the exams, and thus denying these firefighters, many of whom suffered hardship in order to study and to prepare for these examinations, and were successful, only to see that hard work and effort disregarded and not even acknowledged in the court's opinion. Advertisement And ultimately, as you know, the Supreme Court said that you just can't claim potential disparate impact liability as a city and then deny someone a promotion based on the color of their skin.

There has to be a strong basis in evidence. But you didn't look to see whether there was a basis in evidence to the city's claim. Your summary opinion—unpublished summary order didn't even discuss that. Don't you think that these firefighters and other litigants deserve a more detailed analysis of their claims and an explanation for why you ultimately deny their claim? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: As you know, the court's opinion, issued after discussions en banc, recognized, as I do, the hardship that thefirefighters experience.

That's not been nay-said by anyone. Theissue before the court was a different one. And the one that thedistrict court addressed was what decision the decision makers made; not what people behind the scenes wanted the decision makers to make, but what they were considering.

And what they were considering was the state of the law at the time; and in an attempt to comply with what they believe the law said and what the panel recognized as whatthe 2nd Circuit precedent said, that they made a choice under thatexisting law. The Supreme Court in its decision set a new standard by which an employer and lower court should review what the employer is doing, by the substantial evidence test. That test was not discussed with the panel.

It wasn't part of the arguments below. That was a decision by the court, borrowing from other areas of the law and saying: We think this would work better in this situation. CORNYN: My time's up. LEAHY: Thank you. Thank you very much. I would note in the record—will put in the record a letter of support for Judge Sotomayor's nomination from the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce on behalf of its 3 million Hispanic-owned business members, 60 undersigned organizations, including the El Paso Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Greater Dallas Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Houston Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Odessa Hispanic Chamber of Commerce; and a similar letter from the Arizona Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.

I'd meant to put those in the record before. We'll put them in the record now. SESSIONS: Mr. SESSIONS: I would offer a letter for the record from the National Rifle Association in which they express serious concern about the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor. Also, I noticed that the head of that organization, Mr. LaPierre, wrote an article this morning raising increased concern after yesterday's testimony.

And I would also offer for the record a letter from Mr. Richard Land, the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, also raising concerns.

LEAHY: To—and without objection, those will be made part of the record. And we'll—do you have anything else? Advertisement SEN. SESSIONS: Nothing else. LEAHY: Then I'll yield to Senator Cardin. CARDIN (D-MD): Thank you, Mr.

And Judge Sotomayor, good morning. Welcome back to our committee. I just want you to know that the baseball fans of Baltimore knew there was a judge somewhere that changed in a very favorable way the reputation of Baltimore forever. You are a hero. They now know it's Judge Sotomayor.

You're a hero to the Baltimore baseball fans. Let me explain. The Major League Baseball strike, you allowed the season to continue so Cal Ripken could become the 'Iron Man' of baseball in September 1995. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: (Laughs.) SEN. CARDIN: So we just want to invite you, as a baseball fan, we want to invite you to an Orioles game, and we promise it will not be when the Yankees are playing, so that you can root for the Baltimore Orioles. (Laughter.) JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: That's a great invitation, and good morning, Senator. You can assure your Baltimore fans that I have been to Camden Yards.

It's a beautiful stadium. CARDIN: Well, we think it's the best. Of course, it was the beginning of the new trends of baseball stadiums. And you're certainly welcome. Before this hearing, the people of this country knew that the president had selected someone with incredible credentials to be the Supreme Court member. Now, they know the person is able and is capable and understands the law and has been able to understand what the appropriate role is for a judge in interpreting the law and has done very well in responding to the members of the United States Senate, which I thinks—bodes well for your interaction with attorneys and your colleagues on the bench in having a thorough discussion of the very important issues that will affect the lives of all people in our nation. I do want to first start with the judicial temperament issue and the reference to the almanac on the federal judiciary.

I just really want to quote from other statements that were included in that almanac, where they were commenting about you and saying that: she is very good; she is bright; she's a good judge; she is very smart; she is frighteningly smart; she is intellectually tough; she is very intelligent; she has a very good common-sense approach to the law; she looks at the practical issues; she is good; she's an exceptional judge overall; she's engaged in oral argument; she is well prepared; she participates actively in oral argument; she is extremely hardworking and well prepared. And I want to quote from one of the judges on your circuit, Judge Miner, who was appointed by President Reagan, when he said, 'I don't think I'd go as far as to classify her in one camp or another. I think she just deserves the classification of an (sic) outstanding judge.' Advertisement I say that because maybe you would like to comment to these more favorable comments -- (laughter) -- about how the bar feels about your service on the bench. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I—thank those who have commented in the way they did.

I think that most lawyers who participate in argument before me know how engaged I become in their arguments and trying to understand them. And as I indicated yesterday, that can appear tough to some people, because active engagement can sometimes feel that way. But my style is to engage as much as I can so I can ensure myself that I understand what a party's intending to tell me. I am, in terms of what I do, always interested in understanding, and so that will make me an active participant in argument.

As I noted yesterday, I have colleagues who never ask questions. There are some judges on the Supreme Court who rarely ask questions, and others ask a lot of questions. Judges approach issues in different ways, with different styles, and mine happens to be on one end of the style, and others choose others. CARDIN: Well, I thank you for that response. I agree with you that the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, are timeless documents, and have served our nation well for over 200 years, and the envy of many other nations. Advertisement Representatives.

There's clear intent of Congress to continue to protect voters in this country. In the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One versus Holder, one justice on the court, in dictum, challenged Congress's authority to extend the civil rights case. Now, I say that knowing your view about giving due deference to Congress, particularly as it relates to expanding and extending civil rights protections.

So my question to you is, tell me a little bit about your passion for protecting the right of vote, to make sure that the laws are enforced as Congress intended to guarantee to every American the right to participate at the voting place. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: When we speak about my passion, I don't think that the issue of guaranteeing each citizen the right to vote is unique to me or that it's different among any senator or among any group of people who are Americans. It is a fundamental right. And it is one that you've recognized Congress has addressed for decades and has done an amazing job in passing a wide variety of statutes in an effort to protect that right.

The question that a court would face in any individual situation is whether an act of Congress conflicts with some right of either the state or an individual with respect to the issue of voting. There could be other challenges raised on a wide variety of different basises (sic), but each case would present its own unique circumstance. There is one case involving the Voting Rights Act where I addressed the issue of the right to vote.

And in that case, I issued a dissent on an en banc ruling by my court—for the public who may not understand what 'en banc ruling' means, when the whole court is considering an issue—in that case, if it wasn't 13, it may have been 12 members of the court; we're complement of 13 judges, but I right now can't remember if were a full complement at the time— considering an issue—the majority upheld a state regulation barring a group of people from voting. I dissented, on a very short opinion, one-paragraph opinion, saying these are the words of Congress in the statute it passed. And the words are that no state may impose a—and I'm paraphrasing it now; I'm not trying to read the statute—but no condition or restriction on voting that denies or abridges the right to vote on the basis of race. I noted that, given the procedural posture of that case, that the plaintiff had alleged that that's exactly what the state was doing, and I said that's the allegation on the complaint. That's what a judge has to accept on the face of the complaint.

We got to give him a chance to prove that. And that, to me, was the end of the story. To the extent that the majority believed that there was a lot of discussion among the variety of different opinions in the case as to whether this individual could or could not prove his allegation, and there was a suggestion by both sides that he might never be able to do it, my point was a legal one. These are Congress's words.

We have to take them at their word. And if there's an end result of this process that we don't like, then we have to leave that to Congress to address that issue. We can't fix it by ruling against what I viewed as the express words of Congress. Advertisement SEN. CARDIN: Let me use your quote there because I thought it was particularly appropriate.

You said, 'I trust that Congress would prefer to make needed changes itself rather than to have the courts to do so for it.' And I think the members of this committee would— would agree with you. And, as you responded to Senator Grassley in regards to the Riverkeeper case, you said you give deference to Congress. I think we all share that. One of my concerns is that we are seeing judicial activism in restricting the clear intent of Congress in moving forward on fundamental protections. And let me move, I might, to the environment, which is an area that is of great concern to all of us. In the past 50 years, Congress has passed important environmental laws, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act and Superfund.

Despite the progress we've made over the years, it's important that we keep advancing the protections in our environment. During your testimony yesterday, you made it clear that you understand that senators and members of Congress elected by the people are the ones making policy by passing laws. And you also made it clear that judges apply the laws enacted and—and that they should do so—at least they should do so with deference to the intent of Congress.

Yet we've seen in recent decisions of the Supreme Court, like the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Corps of Engineers and Rapanos v. United States, that they have forced the EPA to drop more than 500 cases against alleged polluters. These—these decisions have impact. And it is clear to many of us that they reject long-standing legal interpretations in the federal Clean Water Act that was done by the Supreme Court, and ignoring the science that served as the foundations for the laws passed by Congress and the intent of Congress to protect American people by providing them with clean water, clean air and a healthy environment.

As a senator from Maryland, I'm particularly concerned about that as it relates to the efforts that we're making on the Chesapeake Bay. Now, I understand that these decisions are now precedent and they are binding, and that it may very well require the Congress to pass laws further clarifying what we meant to say so that we can try to get us back on track.

I understand that. But I would like you to comment and, I hope, reinforce the point that you have said: that in reaching decisions that come to the bench, whether they're environmental laws or other laws that protect our society, you will follow the intent of Congress and will not try to supplant individual judgment that would restrict the protections that Congress has passed for our community. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Believe my case—my cases, my entire record shows that I look at the acts of Congress, as I think the Supreme Court does, with deference, because that is the bedrock of our constitutional system, which is that each branch has a different set of constitutional powers.

That deference must be given to the rights of each branch in each situation—that is, its exercising its powers; and, to the extent that the court has a role—because it does have a role—to ensuring that the Constitution is followed, it attempts to do that. When I say attempt—but it always attempts it with a recognition of the deference it owes to the elected branches in terms of setting policy and making law. Advertisement SEN. CARDIN: Thank you for that response. Let me turn, if I might, to our personal backgrounds. There's been a lot of discussion here about what each of us bring to our position in public life.

Progress for women in this country has not come easily or quickly. At one time, women could not vote, could not serve on juries, could not hold property. I sit here today wanting to feel confident that the Supreme Court and its justices will make key decisions on women's rights, and society will act to ensure continued progress for equality with men and women. Now, we all agree that in rendering an individual decision, a gender or ethnic background should not affect your judgment. There is an importance to diversity, which I think we've all talked about. Each of us bring our life experiences to our job. Your life experience at Princeton, I think, serves as an example.

You attended the school that F. Scott Fitzgerald 90 years—called 'the pleasantest country club in America,' with very restrictive policies as to who could attend Princeton University. By 1972, your freshman class, it was a different place, but still far from where it should be. You—and I admire your efforts to change that at Princeton.

And you were actively involved in improving diversity at that school. And Princeton's a better place today because of your efforts. I think of my own experiences at law school, University of Maryland Law School, which denied admission to Thurgood Marshall, and in my class had very few women. Times have changed. Justice Ginsburg said, referring to the importance of women on the bench, says, 'I think the presence of women on the bench made it possible for the courts to appreciate earlier than they might otherwise that sexual harassment belongs under Title VII.' So on behalf of myself, on behalf of my daughter and two granddaughters, I want to hear from you the importance of different voices in our schools, in our Congress and on the Supreme Court of the United States as to how having diversity, the importance of diversity -- your views as to what steps are appropriate for government to take in helping to improve diversity. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Your comment about your daughter and granddaughter makes me remember a letter I received when I was being nominated to the circuit court.

It was from a woman who said she had 19 daughters and grandchildren, and how much pride she took in knowing that a woman could serve on a court like the 2nd Circuit. And I realized then how important the diversity of the bench is to making people feel and understand the great opportunity America provides to all its citizens. And that has value. That's clear. With respect to the issue of the question of what role diversity serves in the society, it hearkens back almost directly to your previous question. I've been overusing that word 'hearkens.'

Advertisement SEN. CORNYN: (Chuckles.) JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: It almost comes around to your earlier question, which is, that issue is one that starts with the legislative branches in the government, its executive bodies, and employers who look at their workforce, that look at the opportunities in society and make policy decisions about what promotes that equal opportunity in the first instance. The court then looks at what they have done and determines whether that action is constitutional or not. And with respect at least to the education field, in a very recent set of cases, the Supreme Court looked at the role of diversity in educational decisions, as to which students they would admit, and the court upheld the University of Michigan's law school admissions policy, which— because the school believed that it needed to promote as wide a body and diverse a body of students to ensure that life perspectives, that the experience of students, would be as fulsome as they wished. And they used race there as one of many factors, but not one that compelled the individual choices of student. The court upheld that. And Justice O'Connor, in the opinion she wrote—authored— expressed the hope that in 25 years race wouldn't even need to be considered.

In a separate case, the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy, the court struck that down. And it struck it down because it viewed the use of race as a form of impermissible quota, because it wasn't based on an individual assessment of the people applying, but as an impermissible violation of the equal protection clause and of the law. These situations are always looked at individually and, as I said, in the context of the choices that Congress, the executive branch, an employer is making, and the interests that it's asserting, and the remedy that it's creating to address the interests it's trying to protect. All of that is an individual question for the courts. CARDIN: Well—and you need to look at all the facts in reaching those decisions, which you have stressed over and over again. I want a justice who will continue to move the court forward in protecting those important civil rights.

I want a justice who will fight for people like Lawrence King, who at the age of 15 was shot in the school because he was openly gay. I want a justice who will fight for women, like a 28-year-old Californian who was gang-raped by four people because she was a lesbian. And I want the justice who will fight for people like James Byrd, who was beaten and dragged by a truck for two miles because he was black. So we need to continue that focus. And you talked about race, and I think about the Gant case that you ruled in, a 6-year-old black child who was removed from school and was treated rather harshly, with racial harassment.

And in your dissent you stated that treatment this 'lone black child' encountered during his (brief?) time in Cook's Hill's (sic) first grade to have been not merely arguable unusual indisputable discretion (sic) but 'unprecedented and contrary' to the school's established policy. Justice Blackmun spoke: In order to get beyond race, we first must take race in—account of race.

And if you ignore race completely, aren't you ignoring facts that are important in a particular case? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Well, it depends on the context of that case that you're looking.

In the Gant case, for example, there were a variety of different challenges brought by the plaintiff to the conduct that was alleged the school had engaged in. I joined the majority in dismissing some of the claims as not consistent with law. But in that case, there was a disparate treatment element, and I pointed out to the set of facts that showed or presented evidence of that disparate treatment.

That's the quote that you were reading from, that this was a sole child who was treated completely different than other children of a different race in the services that he was provided with and in the opportunities he was given to remedy or to receive remedial help. That is obviously different, because what you're looking at is the law as it exists, and the promise that the law makes to every citizen of equal treatment in that situation. CARDIN: Well—and I agree. I think you need to take a look at all the facts and the circumstances.

Office Activation Code 0xc004f074 Microsoft here. And you ignore race, you're ignoring an important point of the facts. Let me talk a little bit about privacy, if I might.

Justice Brandeis describes privacy as the right to be left alone. In other words, if we must restrict this right, it must be minimal, and protections must occur before any such action occurs. The Supreme Court has advanced rights of privacy in the Myers (sp) case; the Loving case, which established the fundamental of persons to raise families and to marry whom they pleased, regardless of race; the Lawrence case that states could not criminalize homosexual conduct; Griswold, that allowed for family planning as a fundamental right; and of course Roe v. Wade, which gave women the right to control their own bodies.

I just would like to get your assessment of the role the court faces on privacy issues in the 21st century, recognizing that our Constitution was written in the 18th century and the challenges today are far different than they were when the Constitution was written, as it relates to privacy. The technologies are different today, and the circumstances of life are different. How do you see privacy challenges being confronted in the 21st century in our Constitution and in the courts? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: The right to privacy has been recognized, as you know, in a wide variety of circumstances.

For more than probably 90 years now, close to a hundred, that is the—part of the courts' precedents in applying the immutable principles of the Constitution, the liberty provision of the due-process clause, and recognizing that that provides a right to privacy in a variety of different settings. You've mentioned that line of cases, and there are many others in which the court has recognized that as a right. In terms of the coming century, it's guided by those cases, because those cases provide the court's precedents in framework—and with other cases—to look at how we will consider a new challenge to a new law or to a new situation. That's what precedents do: They provide a framework.

Constitution remains the same; society changes. The situations it brings before courts change. But the principles are in—are the words of the Constitution, guided by how precedent gives or has applied those principles to each situation. And then you take that and you look at the new situation. CARDIN: Thank—in the time that I have remaining, I would like to talk about pro bono. I enjoyed our conversation when we— when you were in my office talking about your commitment to pro bono. I think, as attorneys, we all have a special responsibility for equal justice.

And that requires equal access. It's not just those who can afford a lawyer. The—legal-aid lawyers per capita are about 60 -- one per 6,800. For private attorneys, it's one per 525. This is not equal justice under the law as promised by the etching on the entrance to the United States Supreme Court. Now, it makes a difference if you have a lawyer.

If you have a lawyer, you're more likely to be able to save your home, to get the health care that you need, to be able to deal with consumer problems. And I had the honor of chairing the Maryland Legal Services Corporation. I chaired a commission that looked into legal services in Maryland. I'm proud of the fact that we helped establish that University of Maryland Law School and University of Baltimore Law School required clinical experiences for our law students so they not only get the experience of handling a case but understand the need to deal with people who otherwise could not afford an attorney.

Congress needs to do more in this area. There is no question about that. And I'm hopeful that we will reauthorize the Legal Service Act and provide additional resources. But I would like to get your view as to what is the individual responsibility of a lawyer for equal justice under the law, including pro bono, and how you see the role of the courts in helping to establish the efforts among the legal community to carry out our responsibility. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I know that there's been a lot of attention paid to one speech and its variants that I've given. If you look at the body of my speeches, public service and pro bono work is probably the main topic I speak at—I speak about. Virtually every graduation speech I give to law students, speeches I've given to new immigrants being sworn in as citizens, to community groups of all type, is the importance of participation in bettering the conditions of our society, active involvement in our communities.

And it doesn't have to be active involvement in—in politics. I tell people that.

Just get involved in your community. Work on your school boards. Work in your churches. Work in your community to improve it.

The issue of public service is a requirement under the code of the American Bar Association. Virtually every state has a requirement that lawyers participate in public service in some way. I've given multiple speeches in which I've talked to law school bodies and said make sure your students don't leave your school without understanding the critical importance of public service in what they do as lawyers. In that we are in full agreement, Senator. To me, that's a core responsibility of lawyering.

Our Founding Fathers, they became what they became—our Founding Fathers—because of their fundamental belief of involvement in their society in public service. And it's a -- to me a spirit that is the charge of the legal profession because that's what we do. We help people—in a different way than doctors do, but helping people receive justice under the law is a critical importance of our work. CARDIN: Well, very, very well said. I look forward to working between Congress and the courts in advancing a strategy.

Thank you, Mr. LEAHY: Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. And Senator Coburn.

TOM COBURN (R-OK): Thank you, Mr. I'd like to ask unanimous consent to put in an article from the newspaper this morning, in The Washington Times. LEAHY: Without objection, it will be placed in the record. COBURN: Welcome, again. And—but first of all, let me apologize to you because I was not able to hear—although I got to read some of your testimony yesterday.

We have a schedule that says we must finish health care within a certain time. Whether we get it right or wrong, we've got to get it done in a certain time. And so I was involved with that, and I apologize. Number two is, I apologize to you for the outbursts that have occurred in this committee. Anybody who values life like I do and who's pro-life recognizes that the way you change minds is not yell at people, is you love them, and you care about their concerns and you—(word inaudible) -- them to a level of understanding, not condemnation. And so for that, I apologize.

I admire your composure. And I thank the chairman and the ranking member for the way they handled that as well. I want to spend a few moments with you, but I kind of want to change the tone here a little bit in terms of what we talk about. A lot of Americans are watching this hearing.

And when I get together with a couple of doctors, they don't understand half of what I say. And when two lawyers talk, most of us who aren't lawyers, like I'm not, have trouble following. So I want us to use words that the American people can truly understand as I both ask you questions and as you answer them.

I will try to do that, and I hope that you will, as well, because I think it benefits our country to do that. You've been asked a lot of questions about abortion. And you've said that Roe v. Wade is settled law. Where are we today? What is the settled law in America about abortion?

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can speak to what the court has said in its precedent. In Planned Parenthood versus Casey, the court reaffirmed the core holding of Roe versus Wade, that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy in certain circumstances. In Casey, the court announced that in reviewing state regulations that may apply to that right, that the court considers whether that regulation has an undue burden on the woman's constitutional right. That's my understanding of what the state of the law is. COBURN: So let me give you a couple of cases.

Let's say I'm 38 weeks pregnant and we discover a small spina bifida sac on the lower sacrum, the lower part of the back, on my baby, and I feel like I just can't handle a child with that. Would it be legal in this country to terminate that child's life? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can't answer that question in the abstract, because I would have to look at what the state of the state's law was on that question and what the state said with respect to that issue. I can say that the question of the number of weeks that a woman is pregnant has been—that approach to looking at a woman's act has— was changed by Casey. The question is, is the state regulation regulating what a woman does an undue burden? And so I can't answer your hypothetical, because I can't look at it as an abstract without knowing what state laws exist on this issue or not. And even if I knew that, I probably couldn't opine, because I'm sure that situation might well arise before the court.

COBURN: Okay. Well, does technology—in terms of the advancement of technology, should it have any bearing whatsoever on the way we look at Roe v.

For example, published reports, most recently of a 21-week -- 21-week—that's 142 days—fetus alive and well now at 9 months of age with no apparent complications because the technology has advanced so far that we can now save children who are born prematurely at that level—should that have any bearing as we look at the law? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: The law has answered a different question.

It's talked about the constitutional right of women— SEN. COBURN: I understand— JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: -- in certain circumstances.

And, as I indicated, the issue becomes one of what's the state regulation in any particular circumstance. COBURN: I understand. But all I'm asking is, should it have any bearing? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can't answer that in the abstract, because the question as it would come before me wouldn't be in—an—in the way that you form it as a citizen. It would come to me as a judge in the context of some action that someone's taking, whether—if it's the state, the state; if it's a private citizen being controlled by the state, challenging that action—those issues are— SEN. COBURN: But viability is a portion of a lot of that. And a lot of the decision—have been made basis (sic) on viability.

If we now have viability at 21 weeks, why would that not be something that should be considered as we look at the status of what can and cannot happen in terms of this right to privacy that's been granted under Roe v. Wade and Casey? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: All I can say to you is what the court's done. COBURN: Right. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: And the standard that the court has applied, what factors it may or may not look at within a particular factual situation, can't be predicted in a way to say, 'Yes, absolutely, that's going to be considered,' 'No, this won't be considered.' COBURN: All I'm asking is whether it should.

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: That— SEN. COBURN: Should viability, should technology, at any time, be considered as we discuss these very delicate issues that have such an impact on so many people? And your answer is that you can't answer it. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can't because that's not a question that the court reaches out to answer. COBURN: Well— JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: That's a question that gets created by a state regulation of some sort or an action by the state that may or may not, according to some claimant, place an undue burden on her. We don't make policy choices in the court.

We look at the case before us with the interests that are argued by the parties, look at our precedent, and try to apply its principles to the arguments parties are raising. COBURN: I'm reminded of one of your quotes that says you do make policy. And I won't continue that. I—I'm concerned, and I think many others are—does a state legislature have the right under the Constitution to determine what is death? Have we statutorily defined—and we have in 50 states and most of the territories—what is the definition of death? You think that's within the realm of the Constitution that states can do that?

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: It depends on what they're applying that definition to. And so there are situations in which they might and situations where that definition would or would not have applicability to the dispute before the court. All state action is looked at within the context of what the state is attempting to do and what liabilities it's imposing. COBURN: But you would not deny the fact that states do have the right to set up statutes that define, to give guidance to their citizens what constitutes death? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: As I said, it depends on in what context they're attempting to do that. COBURN: They're doing it so they limit the liability of others with regard to that decision, which would inherently be the right of the state legislature, as I read the Constitution. You may have a different response to that.

And—which bring me back to the technology again. As recently as six months ago, we now record fetal heartbeats at 14 days post-conception.

We record fetal brainwaves at 39 days post-conception. And I don't expect you to answer this, but I do expect you to pay attention to it as you contemplate these big issues—is we have this schizophrenic rule of the law where we have defined death as the absence of those, but we refuse to define life as the presence of those. And all of us are dependent at different levels on other people during all stages of our development from the very early in the womb, outside of the womb, to the very late. And it concerns me that we are so inaccurate—or inaccurate's an improper term— inconsistent in terms of our application of logic. You said that Roe v. Wade is settled law yesterday. And—and and I believe it's settled under the basis of the right to privacy, which has been there.

So the question I'd like to turn to next is, in your ruling, the 2nd Circuit ruling on—and I'm trying to remember the name of the case—Maloney—the position was is that there's not an individual fundamental right to bear arms in this country. Is that—is that a correct understanding of that? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: No, sir. COBURN: Okay.

Please educate me, if you would. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: In the Supreme Court's decision in Heller, it recognized an individual right to bear arms as a right guaranteed by the Second Amendment, an important right, and one that limited the actions a federal—the federal government could take with respect to the possession of firearms. And in that case we're talking about handguns. The Maloney case presented a different question, and that was whether that individual right would limit the activities that states could do to regulate the possession of firearms. That question is addressed by a legal doctrine.

That legal doctrine uses the word 'fundamental,' but it doesn't have the same meaning that common people understand that word to mean. To most people, the word, by its dictionary term, is: critically important, central. Fundamental: it's sort of rock basis. Those meanings are not how the law uses that term when it comes to what the states can do or not do. The term has a very specific legal meaning, which means: Is that amendment of the Constitution incorporated against the states? COBURN: Through the 14th Amendment? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Through—and others, but the—generally.

I shouldn't say 'and others'; through the 14th. The question becomes whether and how that amendment of the Constitution, that protection, applies or limits the states to act. In Maloney, the issue for us was a very narrow one. We recognized that Heller held—and it is the law of the land right now in the sense of precedent—that there is an individual right to bear arms, as it applies to government, federal government, regulation. The question in Maloney was different for us. COBURN: Okay. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Was that right incorporated against the states?

And we determined that, given Supreme Court precedent, precedent that had addressed that precise question and said it's not—so it wasn't fundamental in that legal doctrine sense—that was the court's holding. COBURN: Did the Supreme Court say in Heller that it definitely was not, or did they just fail to rule on it?

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: Well, they failed to rule on it, you're right, but I— SEN. COBURN: Okay.

There's a very big difference there. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I agree. COBURN: Okay. Let me continue with that. So I sit in Oklahoma in my home, and what we have today as law in the land as you see it is, I do not have a fundamental incorporated right to bear arms; as you see the law today. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: It's not how 'I' see the law. COBURN: Well, as you see the interpretation of the law today.

In your opinion of what the law is today, is my statement a correct statement? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: No, it's not my interpretation; I was applying both Supreme Court precedent deciding that question and 2nd Circuit precedent that had directly answered that question and said it's not incorporated.

The issue of whether or not it should be is a different question, and that is the question that the Supreme Court may take up. In fact, in his opinion, Justice Scalia suggested it should. But it's not what 'I' believe; it's what the law has said about it. COBURN: So, what does the law say today about the statement? Where do we stand today about my statement that I have—I claim to have a fundamental, guaranteed, spelled-out right under the Constitution, that is individual and applies to me, the right to own and bear arms. Am I right or am I wrong? JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: I can't answer of incorporation other than to refer to precedent.

Precedent says— SEN. COBURN: I understand. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: -- as the 2nd Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's precedent— SEN. COBURN: I understand that. JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: -- that it's not a—it's not incorporated.

It's also important to understand that the individual issue of a person bearing arms is raised before the court in a particular setting. COBURN: Context, yes.

JUDGE SOTOMAYOR: And by that I mean what the court will look at is a state regulation of your right and then determine can the state do that or not. So, even once you recognize a right, you're always considering what the state is doing to limit or expand that right, and then decide is that okay constitutionally.

COBURN: It's very interesting to me—I went back and read the history of the debate on the 14th amendment. For many of you who don't now, what generated much of the 14th Amendment was, in Reconstruction, Southern sates were taking away the right to bear arms by freedmen, recently freed slaves. And much of the discussion in the Congress was to restore that right of the Second Amendment, through the 14th Amendment, to restore an individual right that was guaranteed under the Constitution.

So one of the purposes for the 14th Amendment, the reason—one of the reasons it came about is because those rights were being abridged in the Southern states post-Civil War. Let me move on. In the Constitution, we have the right to bear arms.

MANY OF AMERICA’S WAR VETERANS are still alive, and sometimes they wander back to the old battlefields. 5, Charlayne Hunter-Gault visited the Athens campus of the University of Georgia, where the Reverend Jesse Jackson delivered a speech honoring her and Hamilton Holmes, the first two black students to break the color barrier there 31 years ago. It was a ringing performance, an incantatory vision of a world of “many patches, many pieces, many colors,” and when it was over, Hunter-Gault was hugging him with tears running down her face. An award-winning national correspondent on PBS’s MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, Hunter-Gault, 50, offers a thin slice of herself in public—the unemotional professional. But to those who know her well, “she’s an excitable, even eccentric person,” says her close friend Ed Bradley of CBS’s 60 Minutes. “I’ve seen her waltz around balancing a Moroccan plate on her head.” Hunter-Gault has also kept in shadow her role as a civil rights pioneer who, together with Holmes (now an orthopedic surgeon in Atlanta), integrated UGA in 1961.

But in her new memoir, In My Place (Farrar, Straus & Giroux), she talks about those tumultuous years—and the fortitude that saw her through the riots and the racism. “Their rocks, their bricks, their spit never touched me,” she says, “because in my head I was an African queen.” One of three children of Methodist Army chaplain Charles Hunter and his wife, Althea, she was born in the hamlet of Due West, S.C., and spent her early years in the picturesque north Georgia town of Covington—where CBS films In the Heat of the Night. When the family moved to Atlanta in 1951, Hunter-Gault was already plotting how to become a journalist—just like her comic-strip hero, Brenda Starr. She became a top student at Turner High, the city’s premier black school, and a striking homecoming queen in 1958. It was because they had such sparkling records that she and classmate Holmes were approached by civil rights leaders about breaking Georgia’s college color line.

Both students agreed, even though no white university in the Deep South had then been successfully desegregated. And nobody knew what the reaction might be in Athens, 75 miles from Atlanta—in Hunter-Gault’s words, “on the other side of some of the most backward, racist little towns in Georgia.” In January 1961, a year and a half after she and Holmes applied Hunter-Gault was already enrolled at Wayne State University in Detroit), a federal judge ordered the integration of UGA. On registration day a crowd of while students surrounded Hunter-Gault’s car and started rocking it until they were chased away by a dean.

“I was in that car,” says Althea Hunter, “and I was frightened. I didn’t know if she’d be killed or what.” Two nights later a mutinous crowd—some 1,000 strong—began milling outside Hunter-Gault’s dorm.

A brick crashed through the window, spattering glass on her still packed clothes. “The crazier things get, the calmer I get,” Hunter-Gault says. “I remember thinking, ‘I’m in the middle of a riot. So this is now it is.

After police dispersed the rioters with tear gas, Hunter-Gault was led to a ear weeping with anger: she and Holmes had just been suspended “for their own safety,” said a university official. The next day, a federal court ordered them back to slay. During the next 2½ years, the pair were occasionally threatened.

Faculty members patrolled the halls outside some of Charlayne’s classes to keep troublemakers away. Holmes once had to pretend he had a gun in his pocket to make a group of while students back off. “Charlayne’s sense of irony helped her,” says Calvin Trillin who covered the UGA integration battle for TIME.

“She was watching herself go through it and watching the press watching her go through it.” In fact aspiring journalist Hunter-Gault says she was studying her craft by learning which reporters she wanted to emulate. A handful of white students did befriend her. One was Walter Stovall, whom she secretly married shortly before earning her degree in journalism—in 1963. Alter graduation they moved to New York City, had a daughter, Susan (now 29 and an aspiring singer), and amicably divorced several years later.

“Socially, politically we were very much in sync,” says Hunter-Gault. “But Walter wasn’t in much of a hurry, and I was. I was out to prove to the world I should be famous and not because I was black.” Following a stint as the first black staffer at The New Yorker in Manhattan, she worked from 1969 to 1978 for The New York Times, creating the post of Harlem bureau chief. Midway in her tenure she banged out a seismic, 11-page internal memo to the top editors protesting the fact that all her references to “black” were changed to “Negro, ” and assailing the presumptions her white bosses made about blacks and black coverage.

Within days the Times adopted the word black. “Nowadays it seems almost silly,” says Hunter-Gault. Crack Waves 9 Plugin there. “But it was one of those defining moments in the history of black journalism in major white institutions.” Looking for broader scope, she became a correspondent on MacNeil/Lehrer in 1978 and since then has interviewed such heavyweights as Norman Schwarzkopf and Yitzhak Shamir and even dodged Scud missiles in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. Over the years she has acquired a reputation as a sometimes spiky boss.

“I’ve become more exacting as I’ve gotten older,” she says. “But if I’m aware I’ve hurt somebody’s feelings, it bothers me and I’ll try to talk to them about it.” Her astringency rarely shows up on TV.

“She can be disarming as an interviewer, Southern and sweet, says friend Audrey Edwards, editor-at-large at Essence magazine. “She strokes rather than slashes, and it encourages subjects to drop their guard.” With all the interviews and book parties surrounding In My Place, Hunter-Gault has also been loosening up a bit. Recently Bill Cosby threw her a lavish, celebrity-packed do at his Manhattan town house, where Hunter-Gault chatted with Jacqueline Onassis about the fact that they both have large feel. Hunter-Gault describes herself as work obsessed, but friends say she has a strong relationship with her husband, Ronald Gault, 51, an investment banker-she married in 1971, and with her two children.

(She and Gault have a son, Chuma, 20.) She loves tennis and is learning to ski. Though racial progress at UGA has sometimes seemed as slow as Hunter-Gault on the slopes—today black enrollment is only 6 percent—she says she is “optimistic” about change there. But then Hunter-Gault has always had an appetite for combat. When she was told during her visit to Athens that some black students leave after a year because they don’t feel welcome, she wasn’t sympathetic. “If you retreat to remove struggle from your life, You are very mistaken,” she says.

“It’s not over. It may never be over. But I find joy in that struggle.”.